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Abstract 
 
This paper finds strong empirical support of a positive, although quite lagged, relationship 
between rapid credit growth and loan losses. Moreover, it contains empirical evidence of 
more lenient credit terms during boom periods, both in terms of screening of borrowers and 
in collateral requirements. Therefore, we confirm the predictions from theoretical models 
based on disaster myopia, herd behaviour institutional memory and agency problems 
between banks’ managers and shareholders regarding the incentives of the former to engage 
in too expansionary credit policies during lending booms. The paper also develops a 
prudential tool, based on loan loss provisions, for banking regulators in order to cope with the 
former problem. 
 
JEL: E32, G18, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
Banking supervisors, through many painful experiences, are quite convinced that banks’ 
lending mistakes are more prevalent during upturns than in the midst of a recession.1 In good 
times both borrowers and lenders are overconfident about investment projects and their 
ability to repay and to recoup their loans and the corresponding fees and interest rates. 
Banks’ over optimism about borrowers future prospects bring about more liberal credit 
policies with lower credit standards requirements.2 Thus, some negative net present value 
projects are financed just to find later the impairment of the loan or the default of the 
borrower. On the other hand, during recessions, when banks are flooded with non-performing 
loans and specific provisions, they suddenly turn very conservative and tighten credit 
standards well beyond positive net present values. Only their best borrowers get new 
funds and, thus, lending during downturns is safer and credit policy mistakes much lower. 
Across many jurisdictions and at different points in time, bank managers seem to overweight 
concerns regarding type 1 lending policy errors (i.e. good borrowers not getting a loan) during 
economic booms and underweight type 2 errors (i.e. bad borrowers getting financed). The 
opposite happens during recessions. 
Several explanations have appeared in the literature to account for, at first sight 
irrational, behaviour of banks’ managers. Disaster myopia, herd behaviour, agency problems 
and the institutional memory hypothesis are the main arguments to rationalise fluctuations in 
credit policies. 
Disaster myopia arises when it is impossible to assign a probability to a future event 
[Guttentag and Herring (1984)]. Such an event might be the result of a change in the 
economic regime, a change in the regulatory framework or a natural or man-made disaster. If 
managers can not discount the effects of a future negative event, then they may be more 
prone to credit expansion and, when the event happens, drastically cut lending. 
Secondly, herd behaviour [Rajan (1994)] explains why banks’ managers are prepared 
to finance negative NPV projects during expansions. Credit mistakes are judged more 
leniently if they are common to the whole industry. Moreover, a bank manager that 
systematically losses market share and that underperforms their competitors in terms of 
earnings growth increases its probability of being sacked. Thus, managers have a strong 
incentive to behave as their peers which, of course, at an aggregate level enhances 
lending booms and recessions. Reputational and short term objectives are prevalent and 
might explain why banks are prepared to finance negative NPV projects during expansions 
that, later on, will become non-performing loans. 
The classical principal-agency problem between bank shareholders and managers 
can also feed excessive volatility into loan growth rates. Managers, once they obtain a 
reasonable return on equity for their shareholders, may engage in other activities that 
depart from firm value maximization and focus more on managers’ rewards. One of these 
activities might be excessive credit growth in order to increase the social presence of the 
bank (and its managers) or the power of managers in a continuously enlarging organisation 
[Williamson (1963)]. If managers are rewarded more in terms of growth objectives instead of 
profitability targets, incentives to rapid growth might also be the result. The former has been 
                                                                          
1. See, for instance, Crockett (2001), Caruana (2002) or Ferguson (2004). 
2. A loose monetary policy can also contribute to over optimism through excess liquidity provision. 
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documented earlier by the expense preference literature and, more recently, by the literature 
that relates risk and managers incentives.3 
More recently, Berger and Udell (2003) have developed a complementary hypothesis 
in order to explain the markedly cyclical profile of loans and non-performing loan losses. They 
call it the institutional memory hypothesis and, essentially, it states that as time passes since 
the last loan bust, loan officers become less and less skilled in order to avoid granting loans to 
high risk borrowers. That might be the result of two complementary forces. First of all, the 
proportion of loan officers that experienced the last bust decreases as the bank hires new, 
younger, employees and the former ones retire. Thus, there is a loss of learning experience. 
Secondly, some of the experienced officers may forget about the lessons of the past and the 
more far away is the former recession the more they will forget.4 
The four former arguments are based on imperfect information,5 either in credit 
markets or between managers and bank shareholders. All of them might get worse with 
increasing competition among banks or between banks and other financial intermediaries. 
Strong competition erodes net interest and gross income margins as both loan and deposit 
interest rates get closer to the interbank rate. To compensate the fall in profitability, bank 
managers increase asset growth (i.e. loan growth) and that can come at the expense of the 
(future) quality of their loan portfolios. Nevertheless, that will not impact immediately on 
problem loans, so it might encourage further loan growth. Credit growth satisfies managers’ 
other interests (expense preference, power, status, etc.) and, even if it goes beyond 
reasonable levels, it might still do not trigger a response from them since they are subject to 
disaster myopia and fading memories of the last bust. 
Finally, collateral might also play a role in fuelling credit cycles. Usually, loan booms 
are intertwined with asset booms.6 Rapid increases in land, house or share prices increase 
the availability of funds for those that can pledge them as collateral. At the same time, the 
bank is more willing to lend since it has an (increasingly worthier) asset to back the loan in 
case of trouble. On the other hand, it could be possible that the widespread confidence 
among bankers results in a decline in credit standards, including the need to pledge collateral. 
Collateral, as risk premium, can be thought to be a signal of the degree of tightening of 
individual bank loan policies. 
Despite the theoretical developments and the banking supervisors’ experiences, the 
empirical literature providing evidence of the link between rapid credit growth and loan losses 
is scant.7 In this paper we produce clear cut evidence of a direct, although lagged, 
relationship between credit cycle and credit risk. A rapid increase in loan portfolios is 
positively associated with an increase in non-performing loan ratios later on. Moreover, those 
loans granted during boom periods have a higher probability of default than those granted 
during slow credit growth periods. Finally, we show that in boom periods collateral 
requirements are relaxed while the opposite happens in recessions, which we take it as 
evidence of looser credit standards during expansions. 
Regarding the empirical evidence, the first model contains both macro and micro 
variables at the bank level in order to explore the relationship between lending growth and ex 
post credit risk. The second model is entirely based on Credit Register information and 
                                                                          
3. For the former, see, among others, Edwards (1977), Hannan and Mavinga (1980), Verbugge and Jahera (1981), 
Smirlock and Marshall (1983), Akella and Greenbaum (1988) and Mester (1989). For the later, Saunders et al. (1990), 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Esty (1997). 
4. Kindleberger (1978) contains the idea of fading bad experiences among economic agents. 
5. See Crockett (1997) for a good summary of many of the former arguments. 
6. See, Hofmann (2001), Borio and Lowe (2002) and Davis and Zhu (2004). 
7. Clair (1992), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Keeton (1999) and Salas and Saurina (2002) are a few exceptions. 
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focuses on loan by loan operations. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such an 
empirical study relating credit cycle phase and future problem loans is being carried out. 
Finally, the analysis of collateral also relies on loan by loan operations. 
The three empirical avenues provide similar results: in boom periods, when banks 
increase their lending at high (by historical terms) speed, the seeds for rising problem loans in 
the future are being sowed. During recession periods, when banks curtail credit growth, they 
become much more cautious, both in terms of the quality of the borrowers and the loan 
conditions (i.e. collateral requirements). Therefore, banking supervisors’ concerns are well 
rooted both in theoretical and empirical grounds and deserve careful scrutiny and a proper 
answer by regulators. We call the former findings procyclicality of ex ante credit risk as 
opposed to the behaviour of ex post credit risk (i.e. impaired or non-performing loans) which 
increases during recessions and declines in good periods.8 The main issue here is to realise 
that lending policy mistakes occur in good times and, thus, a prudential response from the 
supervisor might be needed at those times. 
Capital requirements and loan loss provisions are two of the most important 
prudential tools that banking regulators use in order to reinforce the solvency of individual 
institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. Basel II latest developments 
have lead to use the capital to cover unexpected losses while loan loss provisions are 
devoted to cover expected losses. Credit cycle developments mentioned before impact 
mainly on expected losses. So, it seems that the first regulatory answer would be to cope 
with credit risk resulting from lending cycles using loan loss provisions. If accounting or 
whatsoever restrictions render this mechanism not available, Basel II Pilar 2 might be very well 
suited to accommodate this prudential mechanism in terms of stress testing.9 
In this paper we develop a new regulatory devise specifically designed to cope with 
procyclicality of ex ante credit risk. It is a forward looking loan loss provision that takes into 
account the former empirical results. At the same time, it can be thought of as being based 
on the concept of stress testing expected losses differently across a credit cycle. Spain 
already had a dynamic provision (the so-called statistical provision) with a clear prudential bias 
[Fernández de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2000)]. The main criticism to that provision (coming 
from accountants not from banking supervisors) was that resulting total loan loss provisions 
were excessively “flat” through an entire economic cycle. The new proposal, although sharing 
the prudential concern of the statistical provision, does not achieve, by construction, a flat 
loan loss provision through the cycle. Instead, total loan loss provisions are still higher in 
recessions but they are also significant when credit policies are the most lax and, therefore, 
credit risk, according to supervisors’ experiences and our empirical findings, is entering at a 
high speed on bank loan portfolios. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the empirical 
evidence on credit cycles and credit risk. Section 3 explains the rational and workings of the 
new regulatory tool through a simulation exercise. Section 4 contains a policy discussion and, 
finally, section 5 concludes. 
                                                                          
8. A thorough discussion of banking regulatory tools to cope with procyclicality of the financial system is in 
Borio et al. (2001). 
9. Wall and Koch (2000) underline the differences in approaches between banking and market regulators regarding 
provisioning policies. Borio and Tsatsaronis (2004) open a way forward to decouple between the provision of unbiased 
information to investors and a degree of prudence in banks’ behaviour. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0531 
2 Empirical evidence on lending cycles and credit risk 
This section encompasses three different empirical exercises. First of all, we investigate the 
relationship between credit growth and problem loans on a bank to bank basis. We control 
for macro variables and bank specific variables. Secondly, we focus on default probabilities of 
individual loans. Finally, we analyse collateral requirements depending of the lending cycle 
position of each bank. 
2.1 Problem loan ratios and credit growth 
Salas and Saurina (2002) model problem loan ratios as a function of both macro and micro 
(i.e. bank balance sheet) variables.10 They find that lagged credit growth has a positive and 
significant impact on ex post credit risk measures. Here, we follow the former paper in order 
to disentangle the relationship between past credit growth and current problem loans. 
Although in spirit the methodology is similar, there are some important differences worth to be 
pointed out. First of all, we use a longer period which allows us to consider two lending cycles 
of the Spanish economy. Secondly, we focus more on loan portfolio characteristics (industry 
and regional concentration and importance of collateralized loans) of the bank rather than on 
balance sheet variables which are much more general and difficult to interpret. Finally, we 
take advantage of the information coming from the Credit Register where all banks must 
inform of all their loans above € 6,000.11 That allows us to control for bank portfolio 
characteristics, such as industry and geographical concentration of loans, and for the role 
played by collateralised loans.12 
The equation we estimate is the following: 
itiititititit
ititit
ttttitit
εηSIZEωCOLFIRφCOLINDφHERFIχHERFRχ
LOANGδLOANGδLOANGδ
RIRβRIRβGDPGβGDPGβNPLαNPL
++++++
+++
+++++=
−−−
−−−
2121
443221
1431211
 (1) 
where NPLit is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans for bank i in year t. In fact, we 
estimate the logarithmic transformation of that ratio [i.e. ln (NPLit/(100-NPLit))] in order to not 
curtail the range of variation of the endogenous variable. Since problem loans present a lot of 
persistence, we include the left-hand-side variable in the right-hand-side lagged one year. 
We control for the macroeconomic determinants of credit risk (i.e. common shocks to all 
banks) through the real rate of growth of the gross domestic product (GDPG), and the real 
interest rate (RIR), proxied as the interbank interest rate less the inflation of the period. Both 
variables are included contemporaneously as well as lagged one year since some of the 
impacts might take some time to appear. 
Our variable of interest is the loan growth rate, lagged 2, 3 and 4 years. A positive 
and significant parameter for those variables will be empirical evidence supporting the 
                                                                          
10. There is a growing interest on the interaction of macro and micro prudential frameworks to analyse financial stability 
[Borio (2003) and references therein]. 
11. A detailed description of Banco de España Credit Register can be found in Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez 
et al. (2005). 
12. Some papers have focused on the procyclical behaviour of loan loss provisions as a proxy for ex post 
credit risk [Cortavarria et al. (2000), Bikker and Hu (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Pain (2003)]. However, loan 
loss provisions are subject to substantial discretionary behaviour by bank managers, thus, distorting its content 
[Collins et al. (1995)]. 
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prudential concerns of banking regulators since the swifter the loan growth the higher the 
problem loans in the future. That result also provides a rationale for a loan loss provision that 
takes into account the risk embedded in the point along the cycle in which the loan is 
granted. 
Moreover, we control for risk diversification strategies of each bank. It might be 
argued that the more geographic or industry diversified is a loan portfolio the lower will be the 
credit risk. Thus, we would expect a positive sign for the two Herfindahl indexes (one for 
region, HERFR, and the other for industry, HERFI). However, it can also be argued that banks 
might exploit their better diversified portfolios in order to increase risk and expected return 
[Hughes et al. (1996)]. So, we could not see any empirical difference among diversified and 
concentrated banks since the ex post credit risk would be the same. Usually, the size of the 
bank (SIZE), that is, the market share of the bank in each period of time, is also used as a 
measure of risk diversification. We include it in the model as a control variable since portfolio 
diversification has been properly accounted for. 
Equation (1) includes also the specialization of the bank in collateralised loans, 
distinguishing between those of firms (COLFIR) and those of households (COLIND). It is 
expected to obtain a positive parameter for the former and a negative one for the latter. 
Collateralised loans to firms are riskier owing to observed information paradigm [Jiménez 
and Saurina (2004), and Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2005)] while collateralised loans to 
households are, mainly, mortgages for buying their houses. Historically, those mortgages 
carry out low credit risk. 
Finally, ηi is a bank fixed-effect to control for idiosyncratic characteristics of each 
bank, constant along time. It might reflect the risk profile of the bank, the way of doing 
businesses, etc. εit is a random error. We estimate model (1) in first differences in order to 
avoid that unobservable bank characteristics correlated with some of the right-hand-side 
variables bias the results. Given that some of the explanatory variables might be determined 
at the same time as the left-hand-side variable, we use instrumental variables through DPD 
[Arellano and Bond (1988 and 1991)]. 
All the information from each individual bank comes from the Credit Register 
run by Banco de España. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables. The 
period analysed covers two credit cycles of the Spanish banking sector (from 1984 to 2002), 
with an aggregate maximum for NPL around 1985 and, again, in 1993. We focus on 
commercial and savings banks which represent more than 95% of total assets among credit 
institutions (only small credit cooperatives and specialised financial firms are left aside). 
Some outliers have been eliminated in order to avoid that a small number of observations, 
with a very low relative weight over the total sample, could bias the results. Thus, we have 
eliminated those extreme loan growth rates (i.e. banks with a growth lower or higher than 5th 
and 95th percentile respectively). 
Results appear in Table 2, first column (model 1). As expected since we take first 
differences of equation (1) and εit is white noise, there is first order residual autocorrelation 
and not second order. Sargan test of validity of instruments is also fully satisfactory. The 
results of the estimation are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Regarding the explanatory variables, there is persistence in the NPL variable. The 
macroeconomic control variables are both significant and with the expected signs. Thus, 
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the acceleration of GDP, as well as a decline in real interest rates, brings about a decline in 
problem loans. The impact of interest rates is much more rapid than that of economic activity. 
The more concentrated is the credit portfolio in a region the higher the problem loans ratio 
while industry concentration is not significant. Collateralised loans to households are less risky 
(10% level of significance), mainly because these are mortgages which in Spain have the 
lowest credit risk. The parameter of the collateralised loans to firms, although positive, is not 
significant. The size of the bank does not have a significant impact on the problem loan ratio. 
We cannot conclude from this that diversification is not worth in terms of reducing credit risk 
portfolio since HERFR is positive and significant. 
Finally, regarding the variables which are the focus of our paper, the rate of loan 
growth lagged 4 years is positive and significant (at the 1% level). The loan growth rate 
lagged 3 years is also positive although not significant.13 Therefore, rapid credit growth today 
results in lower credit standards that, eventually, bring about higher problem loans. 
The economic impact of the explanatory variables is significant. The long run 
elasticity of GDP growth rate, evaluated at the mean of the variables, is -1.19; that is, an 
increase of one percentage point in the rate of GDP growth (i.e. GDP grows at 3% instead of 
at 2%) decreases the NPL ratio by 30.1% (i.e. it declines from 3.94% to 2.75%). For interest 
rates, a 100 basis point increase brings about a rise in NPL ratio of around 21.6%. Regarding 
loan growth rates, an acceleration of 1% in the growth rate has a long term impact of a 0.7% 
higher problem loan ratio. 
Given the relevance, from a banking policy point of view, of model 1 results in 
Table 2, we have performed numerous robustness tests. Those tests strongly confirm the 
former result of a positive, lagged and significant relationship between loan growth and credit 
risk. 
Model 2 (second column of Table 2) tests for the asymmetric impact of loan 
expansions and contractions. We augment model 1 with the absolute value of the difference 
between the loan credit growth of bank i in year t and its average over time. All model 1 
results hold but it can be seen that there is some asymmetry: rapid credit growth of a bank 
(i.e. above its own average loan growth), increases non-performing loans (i.e. α+β is positive 
and significant at 5%) while slow growth (i.e. below average) has no significant impact on 
problem loans (i.e. α-β is not significant).14 
If we estimate model 1 augmented with a cubic term (results not shown) in order to 
test for non-linear effects, credit growth lagged 4 years is not significant (although lagged 3 
years is significant at the 10% level), while the cubic term lagged 4 years is significant and 
positive. This is important because it even enhances the effect of credit growth on the risk 
profile of the bank. For instance, the semi-elasticity becomes now 1.2%, instead of 0.7%. 
With respect to the rest of variables included in the model, there is no change either in sign or 
significance. Autocorrelation and Sargan test are equally satisfactory. 
                                                                          
13. Salas and Saurina (2002), with data spanning from 1985 to1997, found a 3-year lag between problem loans and 
credit growth. The increase in the lag we report in this paper is mainly the result of the longer time horizon we have. If we 
considered data up till 2004, the lag is still in 4 years. In any case, the relevant result is the existence of a substantial lag 
between problem loans and credit growth. 
14. Note that in model 1, regression results are the same for the variable rate of growth of loans in bank i at year t than 
for the difference between the former variable and the average rate of growth of loans of bank i along time. That is 
because the later term is constant over time for each bank and disappears when we take first differences in equation (1). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0531 
If instead of focusing on credit growth of bank i (either alone or compared to its 
average growth rate over time), we look at the relative position of bank i in respect to the rest 
of banks at a point in time (i.e. at each year t), we find that (model 3, third column of Table 2) 
still the relative loan growth rate lagged 4 years has a positive and significant impact of bank i 
non-performing loan ratio. The parameter of relative credit growth lagged 3 years is positive 
but not significant. The rest of the variables keep their sign and significance. 
Model 4 (last column of Table 2) shows that there is asymmetry in the response of 
non-performing loans to credit growth. When banks expand their loan portfolios at a speed 
above the average of the banking sector, future non-performing loans increase, while there is 
no significant effect if the loan growth is below the average.15 
Finally, the former results are robust to changes in the macroeconomic control 
variables (not shown). If we substitute time dummies for the change in the GDP growth rate 
and for the real interest rate, the loan growth rate is still positive and significant in lag 4 
(although at the 10% level) and, again, positive although not significant in lag 3. The time 
dummy parameters reflect quite well the non-performing loan ratio evolution along time: from 
year 1990 onwards, problem loans increase as the economy slows down, till the maximum 
in year 1993. From 1994 onwards, loan losses decrease, even further than the level of 1989 
(omitted time dummy), until minimum levels the last years of the sample. Now, the 
geographical concentration of the loan portfolio does not seem to increase problem loans 
while collateralised loans to households are no more of low risk. That is probably due to the 
low variability of both variables along time and the use of time dummies that capture a greater 
amount of it in comparison to GDP growth and real interest rates. 
All in all, we find a robust statistical relationship between rapid credit growth at each 
bank portfolio and problem loans later on. The lag is around four years so, bank managers 
and short term investors (including shareholders) might have incentives to foster today credit 
growth in order to rip short term benefits to the expense of long term bank stakeholders, 
including among the later depositors, the deposit guarantee fund and banking supervisors as 
well. 
The long lag between credit growth and problem loans is very relevant from 
the prudential point of view since it might fuel disaster myopia, herd behaviour and 
agency problems between shareholders and bank managers. Bank managers, pressed by 
their peers, the strong competitive environment, investors focused on quarterly or, at most, 
year profitability figures, and reassured by the fact that more lax credit standards do not 
produce, in the short run, more impaired assets, might be strongly encouraged to follow too 
risky credit policies that, in the medium term, could jeopardise the survival of the bank and, 
from a systemic point of view, threaten the stability of the whole financial system. Prudential 
supervisors are well aware of the former developments and, some of them, as we will see in 
the next section, have recently started to implement appropriate responses. 
                                                                          
15. Note that, the relevant test here is to test if α+β (and α-β) is significant, not each of them alone. 
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2.2 Probability of default and credit growth 
The former subsection has shown a positive relationship between aggregate loan growth and 
aggregate non-performing loan ratios at the level of each bank. Although this result is very 
important from a prudential point of view, the present section explores a new avenue, to our 
knowledge unchartered, for the same prudential policies. Instead of focusing on 
bank-aggregated level credit risk measures, we analyse the probability of default at an 
individual loan level and its relation to the cyclical position of the bank credit policy. The 
hypothesis is that, for the reasons explained in section 1 above, those loans granted during 
credit booms are riskier than those granted when the bank is reining on loan growth. That 
would provide a rigorous empirical micro foundation for prudential regulatory devises aimed at 
covering the losses embedded in rapid credit growth policies. 
In order to test the former hypothesis we use individual loan data from the Credit 
Register. We focus on loans granted to non-financial firms with a maturity larger than one year 
and keep track of them the following years.16 We study only financial loans (i.e. excluding, 
receivables, leasing, etc.), which are 60% of the total loans to non-financial firms in the Credit 
Register, granted by commercial banks and savings banks (95% of market share in loans 
among credit institutions). Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in 
this model. 
The equation estimated is: 
)
)(()1Pr(
321 ititiiiit
iitiitkijt
ηφBANKCHARδDINDδDREGδLOANCHARχ
NGaverageLOALOANGβNGaverageLOALOANGαθFDEFAULT
+++++
−+−+==+
 (2) 
where we model the probability of default of loan j, in bank i, some k years after being granted 
(i.e. at t+2, t+3, and t+4),17 as a logistic function [F(x)=1/(1+exp(-x))] of the characteristics 
of that loan (LOANCHAR), such as its size, maturity (i.e. between one and three years and 
more than three years) and collateral (fully collateralised or no collateral); a set of control 
variables (i.e. the region, DREG, where the firm operates, the industry, DIND, to which the 
borrower pertains), characteristics of the bank that grants the loan such as its size and 
type (i.e. commercial or savings bank). We also control for macroeconomic characteristics 
including time dummies (ϕt). 
We do not consider default immediately after the loan is granted (i.e. in t+1) because 
it takes time for a bad borrower to reveal as such. When they are granted a loan, take the 
money from the bank, invest it into the project and, as the project develops, are able to return 
the loan and the due interest payments or are not, and default. 
Once we have controlled for loan, bank and time characteristics, we add the relative 
loan growth rate of bank i at time t with respect to financial loans granted to non-financial 
firms (LOANGit-averageLOANGi), that is, the current lending position of each bank in 
comparison to its average loan growth. If α is positive and significant we interpret this as a 
                                                                          
16. The level and evolution of PD across time and firm size in Spain can be seen in Saurina and Trucharte (2004). 
On average, large firms (i.e. those with annual sales above € 50 million) have a PD between 4 and 5 times lower than 
that of small and medium sized enterprises (i.e. firms with annual turnover below € 50 million). 
17. We consider that a loan is in default when its doubtful part is larger than the 5% of its total amount. Thus, we 
exclude from default small arrears, mainly technical, that are sorted out by borrowers in a few days and that, usually, 
never reach the following month. 
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signal of more credit risk in boom periods when, probably, credit standards are low. On the 
contrary, when credit growth slows, banks become much more careful in scrutinising loan 
applications and, as a result, next year defaults decrease significantly. To our knowledge, this 
is the first time that such a direct test is run. Additionally, we also test for asymmetries in that 
relationship, as in the previous section. As in the previous model, we have considered only 
those banks with a loan growth rate within the 5th and 95th percentile, to eliminate outliers. 
It is very important to control for the great heterogeneity due to firm effects, even 
more because our database does not contain firm related variables (i.e. balance sheet and 
profit and loss variables). For this reason, we have controlled for firm (loan) characteristics 
using a random effects model, which allow us to take into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity (without limiting the sample as the conditional model does) assuming a zero 
correlation between this firm effects and the rest of the characteristics of the firm. 
Table 4 (Panel A) shows the estimation result for the pool of all loans granted. We 
observe that the faster the growth rate of the bank, the higher the likelihood to default the 
following years. We observe that α is positive and significant when we consider defaults 
three and four years later, and positive, although not significant for defaults two years after the 
loan was granted (Table 4, columns 1, 3, and 5). As mentioned before, although not reported 
in Table 4, we control for macroeconomic characteristics, region and industry of the 
borrowing firm, size and type of bank lender and, finally, for size, maturity and collateral of 
the loan granted.18 
In terms of the economic impact, the semi-elasticity of the credit growth is 0.13% for 
default in t+3 (0.13% in t+4),19 which means that if a bank grows one percentage point above 
its average, then the likelihood of default in t+3 is increased by 0.13% (0.13% in t+4). 
Although these figures are relatively small, when we consider one standard deviation above 
the average rate of growth, the semi-elasticity increases to 1.9% (1.9%). 
 We have also investigated if there is an asymmetric impact of loan growth over 
future loan defaults (columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 4). In good times, when loan growth of each 
bank is above its average, we find a positive and significant impact on future defaults 
(two, three and four years later). However, in bad times, with loan growth below the average 
of the bank, there is no impact on defaults. Thus, this asymmetric effect reinforces the 
conclusions about too lax lending policies during booms. 
To test the robustness of the former results, Panel B in Table 4, shows the 
estimation of the same model than before when the loan growth rate of the bank is 
introduced without any comparison to its average value. The results obtained are exactly the 
same: there is no effect on the probability of default in t+2 and a positive and significant one 
on the likelihood of default in t+3 and t+4. 
All in all, the previous results show that in good times, when credit is growing rapidly, 
credit risk in bank loan portfolio is also increasing. 
                                                                          
18. The same result is obtained if, instead of AVERAGE LOANGi, we use AVERAGE LOANGt, that is, comparing the 
individual loan growth rate to the average rate of the whole banking sector across time. 
19. The marginal effect of the k-variable is computed as: 
[ ] [ ] k
k
k xxdx
xyobd
ME βββ ˆ)ˆ(1)ˆ()1(Pr Λ−Λ=== . 
Then, the semi-elasticity is given by DefaultAverage
MEk . 
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2.3 Collateral and credit growth 
The two former subsections have provided direct tests of the impact of credit growth 
on credit risk. This subsection provides evidence of the behaviour of banks in terms of their 
credit policies along the business cycle. The argument so far has been that too rapid credit 
growth comes with lower credit standards and, later on, manifests in higher problem loans. 
Here, we provide some complementary evidence based on the tight relationship between 
credit cycles and business cycles. We argue that depending on the business cycle position, 
banks adjust their credit policies. For instance, in good times, banks relax credit standards 
and are prepared to be more lenient in collateral requirements. On the other hand, when the 
recession arrives banks toughen credit conditions and, in particular, collateral requirements. 
If the hypothesis presented in the former paragraph is true, we would have 
complementary evidence to support prudential regulatory policies. It is not only that during 
boom times loan portfolios are increasingly loaded with higher expected defaults but also the 
fact that other protective devises for banks, such as collateral, are eroded.20 
The following equation allows us to test the relationship between collateral and 
economic cycle. 
),
()1Pr( 11
ijklt
ttijklt
VariablesControl
GDPAverageGDPGβGDPGαθFCollateral +−++== −−
(3) 
A full description of model (3) and its control variables is in Jiménez, Salas and 
Saurina (2005). Here we only focus on the impact of GDP growth on collateral, 
controlling for the other determinants of collateral. The variable in the left hand side takes the 
value of 1 if the loan is collateralized and 0 otherwise. j refers to the loan, i refers to the bank, 
k refers to the market, l refers to firm (borrower) and t refers to the time period (year). 
We estimate equation (3) using a probit model. As control variables we use borrower 
characteristics (i.e. if they were in default the year before or the year after the loan was 
granted, its indebtedness level and age as borrower), bank characteristics (size, type of bank, 
and its specialization in lending to firms), characteristics of the borrower-lender relationship 
(duration and scope) as well as other control variables (such as the level of competition in the 
loan market, the size of the loan, the industry and the region of the borrower).21 
The database used is, as in section 2.2, the Credit Register. We focus on all new 
financial loans above € 6,000 with a maturity of one year or more, granted by any Spanish 
commercial or savings bank to legal persons (i.e. business) every year during the time-period 
between December 1984 and December 2002. We exclude commercial loans, leasing, 
factoring operations and off-balance sheet commitments for homogeneity reasons. 
In this sample, the 33.6% of all loans are collateralized. By maturity, there is more 
heterogeneity: 54.4% of the loans with maturity larger than 3 years are collateralized, 
while only 8.5% of the rest of loans are secured. 
                                                                          
20. It might also be the case that banks during good times decrease credit risk spreads in their granted loans partially as 
a result of over optimism and tight competition among banks. The opposite would happen in bad times when bank 
managers would tighten credit spreads. Unfortunately, our database does not allow to test this hypothesis. 
21. Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2005) contain a similar analysis on a different sample of loans and using a different 
estimation procedure (i.e. fixed effects). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0531 
The first column in Table 5 shows the results of estimating model (3) for the pool of 
loans, nearly 2 million loans. There is a negative and significant relationship between GDP 
growth rates and collateral; that is, in good times banks lower collateral requirements just to 
increase them in bad times. In terms of the impact, the semi-elasticity of GDPG is -3.1%, 
which means that an increase of one percentage point in the GDPG reduces the likelihood of 
collateral by 3.1%. In the bond market, Altman et al. (2002) find evidence of a positive and 
significant correlation between the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD). 
Our results, focusing on the loan market, show that the positive correlation between PD and 
LGD need not to hold since banks, as the recession approaches (the PD increases), take 
more collateral on their loans which might decrease the LGD.22 
The cyclical behaviour of banks regarding collateral is not symmetric. Column 2 in 
Table 5 shows an asymmetric impact: the likelihood to pledge collateral decreases 
proportionally more in upturns that increases in downturns, as the negative and significant 
value of the parameter of the absolute value of the difference between GDP rate of growth 
and its average across the period studied points out (i.e. -0.092 in upturn versus -0058 in 
downturns). Despite the asymmetry, the negative relationship between loan PD and LGD still 
might hold. Moreover, from a prudential point of view, there are even more concerns 
regarding the too lax credit policies maintained by banks during upturns.23 
Credit markets are segmented across borrowers and across maturities. So, it might 
be possible that the former aggregated results do not hold for particular market segments. To 
carry out this robustness exercise, the database is split into two groups: short-term (maturing 
at one to three years) and long-term (more than three years). A second classification of the 
loans relates to the experience of the borrower. One group of loans, labelled “old”, contains 
those loans from borrowers about whom, at the time the loan is granted, there is already past 
information in the database (for instance, if they were in default the previous year). The other 
group of loans, which we call “new”, is from borrowers obtaining a loan for the first time. 
Table 5 (columns 3 to 6) shows that although there are some differences across the 
maturity of borrowers and across old and new borrowers, the main results hold. For old 
borrowers, the impact of the business cycle on collateral policy is larger for long term loans 
than for short term ones. We find the same result across new borrowers but the magnitude 
of the decline in collateral as the economy improves is lower. For short term loans, both old 
and borrowers, during upturns collateral requirements decline while in downturns they do not 
increase, either because the firm has no collateral to pledge or because banks put in place 
other strategies to recover their short term loans.24 
                                                                          
22. We thank M. Gordy for pointing us this implication. 
23. The same estimation has been carried out replacing GDP growth by the loan growth of the banking sector and the 
results are quite similar. 
24. Again, the same results are obtained if we substitute GDP growth by the loan growth of the banking sector, as in the 
previous footnote. 
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3 A new prudential tool 
The former section has shown clear evidence of a relationship between rapid credit growth 
and a deterioration in credit standards that, eventually leads to a significant increase in credit 
losses. Banking regulators, aware of this behaviour and concerned about long-term solvency 
on individual banks as well as the stability of the whole banking system, might wish to 
implement some devises in order to alleviate the market imperfection. 
Borio et al. (2001) contain a detailed discussion of procyclicality and banking 
regulator responses. There has been a lot of discussion around the impact of Basel II on the 
cyclical behaviour of new capital requirements.25 Here, we want to focus on loan loss 
provisions since we think that they are the proper instrument to deal with expected losses. 
Thus, we propose a new prudential provision that addresses the fact that credit risk builds up 
during credit boom periods. That new provision is on top of the already existing specific (for 
incurred and already identified losses in individual loans) and general provision (for incurred 
and not yet individually identified losses). The latter one can be interpreted as a provision 
for the inherent or latent risk in the portfolio, that is, an average provision across the cycle. 
The new loan loss provision (or the third component of the total loan loss provision) is based 
on the credit cycle position of the bank in such a way that the higher the credit growth of the 
individual bank the more it has to provision. On the contrary the lower the credit growth 
the more provisions can liberate from the previously built reserve. Analytically, we can write: 
 
)1(. −−∆+∆+= tCCCgspeciftotalLLP γα  (4) 
where the total loan loss provision (LLPtotal) has three components: the specific provision 
(specif.), the latent provision (applied on each new loan granted to cover the average credit 
risk, g) and, finally, the third component (cyclical) where Ct-1 is the stock of loans the previous 
period, γ is the average loan growth rate across banks and across a lending cycle, and ∆C is 
the absolute growth in total loans. Thus, when the loan portfolio grows above the average 
historical growth, the provision is positive and negative otherwise. 
Note that in boom periods the loan provision is positive and negative during 
recessions and the more far away the bank behaviour from the total system the larger 
the provisioning impact. The underlying idea is quite simple, the more rapid credit growth, the 
higher the increase in market share and, presumably following our empirical results, the higher 
the credit risk is assuming the bank and, therefore, the higher the loan loss provision. The 
asymmetry found in some of the results of the former section Table 2 points towards an 
increase in loan loss provisions in good times, when credit risk increases and there is rapid 
credit growth, and allowing the previously built loan loss reserves being depleted in 
downturns, when the former rapid credit growth materialises in loan losses. 
The former proposal is a very simple and intuitive prudential tool to cope with credit 
risk linked to cyclical lending policies. That provision is not expected to replace the existing 
provisions but rather to reinforce them. Then, we would have specific provisions for impaired 
assets already individually identified plus provisions to cover inherent losses in homogeneous 
groups of loans (i.e. losses incurred but not yet identified in individual loans). 
                                                                          
25. The issue of procyclicality of capital requirements has risen a lot of attention [Daníelsson et al. (2001), Borio 
et al. (2001) and, more recently, Kashyap and Stein (2003) and Gordy and Howells (2004), to name a few]. 
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The third component of LLPtotal, the cyclical one, has been considered in our 
proposal as an additional loan loss provision. Alternatively, it could count, for instance, as part 
of capital requirements (for instance, asked through Pilar 2 of the Basel II framework). Banking 
supervisors, according to their experiences regarding lending cycles and credit risk, might ask 
banks to hold higher capital levels during booms in order to take into account future problem 
loan developments. Note that this proposal might contribute to alleviate potential concerns, 
if any, about increased capital procyclicality within Basel II framework. 
Simulations 
Probably, the best way to understand the workings of the loan loss provision put forward in 
this section, which we call stress provision, is through a simulation exercise. Table 6 contains 
such an exercise. We simulate a full economic and lending cycle in eleven years. The first two 
years the economy is expanding at full steam which means rapid credit growth and very low 
specific loan loss provisions (as a result of low problem loan ratios). From year 3 onwards 
credit growth decreases and problem loans increase with a subsequent increase in specific 
provisioning requirements. In year 6 the trough is reached with a maximum in provisioning 
requirements and a minimum in lending growth. From year 7 onwards the credit and the 
economy recover and specific provisions decline. 
The mechanism of the stress provision is straightforward. While loan growth rates 
are above the average loan growth rate (i.e. γ=10.1%) the stress provision is positive and 
the amount charged in the P&L is accrued in a stress fund. When loan growth is starting to be 
below the average the stress provision is negative and it is accrued in the P&L from the stress 
fund previously built. After year 9 the stress provision resumes a positive value (as a result of a 
new expansionary credit cycle) and the stress fund is being built again. 
Which is the final impact of the new provision over a framework which already has a 
specific and an inherent risk provision? The total loan loss provision is smoother than the sum 
of the specific and the inherent provisions (Chart 1). But the smoothing is far from total. There 
is still quite significant variation across the credit cycle of total loan loss provisions. Of course, 
during recessions provisions reach the maximum amount, as the specific one dominates the 
landscape. However, in truly boom periods (i.e. year 1 and 2) when loan growth is extremely 
high as a result, quite probably, of less prudent lending policies, provisioning requirements 
through the stress provision are significant. Note that the new provision is also countercyclical 
but given its mechanism is not able to have a significant impact on total loan loss provisions 
unless the variability in credit growth rates is extreme which, for most of the banks is not the 
case. At the same time, the volatility of profits is somewhat lower through the cycle. Note that 
the stress provision is quite transparent and analysts could undo its impact on the P&L or 
even the regulatory capital of the bank. 
The former simulation exercise has used a previously built fund (i.e. the general or 
inherent fund currently accumulated) as the starting point of the simulation (15, or 1.5% of the 
outstanding loan portfolio in year 0 of the simulation). However, it could be possible to start 
the new fund from scratch. The only drawback of that approach would be that, depending on 
the evolution of the credit cycle, it might be possible that the fund was exhausted earlier 
and that some years would remain at zero.26 
                                                                          
26. Of course, it is understood that the fund can not be negative, that is, to write as income in the profit and loss 
statement something that has not been previously built up. 
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4 Policy discussion 
We show clearly in the paper the lagged relationship between credit growth and problem 
loans. We provide evidence of the relationship between loan growth today and future losses. 
Therefore, from a prudential point of view there is a rationale for setting aside provisions since 
the loan is granted, that is to say, since the credit risk enters the balance sheet of the bank.27 
Moreover, the empirical results provide a rationale for countercyclical loan loss provisions, 
apart from those covering impaired assets or the latent risk in the loan portfolio. However, 
accounting frameworks do not fully recognise and, thus, allow for coverage, of the economic 
findings around credit policies. 
From January 2005, all European Union firms (either banks or non-financial firms) 
with quoted securities in any EU organised market will have to comply with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS or IAS). That means a change in the current provisioning 
system based on specific and general provisions. From 2005 onwards, banks will have to set 
aside provisions to cover individually identified impaired assets and, for homogeneous loan 
portfolios, they will be required to cover losses incurred but not yet identified in individual 
loans. 
IAS 39 does not allow to set aside provisions for future losses when a loan is 
granted. Moreover, the new or prudential provision developed in this paper is, probably, even 
less in line with IAS. Therefore, the new IAS do not perfectly match the prudential concerns 
of banking regulators. Borio and Tsatsaronis (2004) show a way forward to sort out this 
problem through a decoupling of objectives (i.e. one is to provide unbiased information and 
the other is to instilling a degree of prudence). To us a more fundamental question is the 
purpose that the accounting framework should serve to and, more importantly, at what price. 
Financial stability concerns and, therefore, prudent accounting, should probably be more up 
into the list of priorities, in particular, since there is overwhelming evidence of earnings 
management. The incentives to alter the accounting numbers will not disappear with IAS.28 
If investors will not, in any case and with a high probability, get the unbiased figures, there 
might be room for instilling prudent behaviour through the accounting rules. 
Alternatively, if accounting principles are written in a way that do not allow for 
sheltering prudential concerns, banking regulators might try other devises in order to 
counterbalance the negative impact of excessive decreases in credit standards during boom 
periods. For instance, Pillar 2 of the new framework put forward by supervisors in Basel II 
might include a stress of capital requirements that might be based along the lines developed 
here for the new provision. In a sense, if the accounting framework does not provide enough 
flexibility to banking supervisors, they should find it through the allowed supervisory discretion 
of Pillar 2. 
Either as an additional loan loss provision or as a capital requirement, the 
third component of total loan loss provisions will help to counter the cyclical behaviour of 
own funds in Basel II. Basel I was not properly tracking banks’ risks. Basel II is meant to have 
                                                                          
27. As for an insurance company, the risk, and the technical provision to cover it, appear just after the insurance policy 
has been sold to the customer. 
28. For a theoretical rationale of income smoothing see, among others, Fudemberg and Tirole (1995) and Goel and 
Thakor (2003). 
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capital requirements more closely tied to risk. Capital requirements will increase during 
recessions as the probability of default increases. However, the evidence provided in this 
paper argues, together with the theoretical papers referenced, that (ex ante) credit risk 
increases during boom periods. Therefore, without interfering with Basel II Pillar 1 capital 
requirements, Pillar 2 adjustment might help to take into account those increases in ex ante 
credit risk and, somehow, soften the procyclicality of capital requirements.29 
Rajan (1994) discusses possible regulatory interventions in order to reduce 
the expansionary bias in lending policies. Among them, to decrease the amount of 
loanable funds or to impose credit controls. However, both proposals do not seem very 
feasible since they might have other negative unintended consequences, as the author 
recognises. Alternatively, a close monitoring of bank portfolios by supervisors, and the 
corresponding penalties, might be the answer. However, that will increase the cost of 
supervision substantially. In our paper we provide a simple mechanism to cope with 
the negative consequences of herd behaviour and managers short-term horizons that is 
cheaply monitored and easily available for bank supervisors. Moreover, the prudential 
provision presented in the former section is not designed to curtail credit growth but to 
account for the negative impact of too liberal lending policies. It is up to each bank manager 
to decide its lending policy but if the lending policy is reckless, loan loss provisions will 
be proportionally higher since the inception of the lending policy just to account for future 
higher credit losses. 
The paper also has some implications in terms of financial information disclosure 
and transparency. It is argued that more disclosure of information by banks will help investors 
to discipline bank managers and, therefore, to help banking supervisors as well. In fact 
that is the main rationale for Pillar 3 of Basel II. However, some recent research [Morris and 
Shin (2002)] points towards a more nuanced position regarding the welfare achievements of 
more transparency and disclosure and the above mentioned widespread existence of 
earnings management. In fact, Rajan (1994) finds what he calls a counterintuitive comparative 
statics: “allowing banks to fudge their accounting numbers and to maintain secret reserves 
(sic) can improve the quality of their lending decisions”. 
As it has been previously mentioned, the new provision is fully transparent. Investors 
and, more generally, any bank stakeholder could “undo” the effects of the stress provision 
since it only needs to look at the lending growth rate of the bank and the average of the 
system. Of course, transparency could improve even more if regulators make compulsory to 
release the amount of the stress provision in the Annual Report of each bank. The issue here 
is that we are not trying to manage earnings or, more precisely, to smooth banks’ income 
through that provision. Instead, we are just trying to cope with latent risks in bank loan 
portfolios not properly address by IAS or even Basel II capital requirements in such a way 
that is fully transparent. Maybe as another prove of counterintuitive reasoning, it might be 
possible that our proposal could contribute to a decline in income smoothing practices across 
banks since, partially at least, some of their causes would be covered by the new provision. 
Thus, contrary to Rajan, banking regulators would have no need for allowing banks more 
discretion to fudge their accounts since, precisely, the regulatory framework would allow for 
an appropriate coverage of latent risks in good times and a lower impact on the P&L in bad 
periods that results in a less volatile pattern for profits through the cycle. 
                                                                          
29. The LLP we propose here might work as the “second instrument” proposed by Goodhart (2005) to maintain financial 
stability. 
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Banco de España has applied the so-called statistical provision from mid-July 2000 
onwards. As it has been mentioned, it is a countercyclical provision. When the three currently 
existing loan loss provisions (i.e. specific, general and statistical) are added up through and 
economic cycle, the quotient between total loan loss provisions and total loans remains 
almost constant along time. Accountants did not ever liked this total smoothing effect along 
the credit cycle. The new provision that we have developed in the former Section does not 
have those drawbacks. First of all, the quotient between total loan loss provisions and total 
loans shows a cyclical pattern (i.e. increases in bad times) but much less pronounced than 
before. Therefore, expected losses are not constant along the entire business cycle. From a 
prudential point of view, it is very important that total loan loss provisions are relatively high in 
the peak of the lending boom. Secondly, although total loan loss provisions are high in boom 
periods, the maximum is reached around the recession, when impaired assets are also at 
their maximum. Thus, loan loss provisions are not completely smooth out along the business 
cycle. 
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5 Conclusions 
Disaster myopia, herd behaviour, agency problems and fading recollections 
of past bad experiences, coupled with increasing banking competition may bring 
about lower credit standards while screening potential borrowers that translate into 
too expansionary credit policies and, eventually, on higher loan losses. Rajan (1994) 
demonstrates that banks’ managers can end up, collectively, financing negative net 
present value projects. That behaviour is the rational response to the short term 
objectives that face those managers. Therefore, a bank regulator concerned about the 
negative effects of too rapid credit growth on individual banks solvency and on 
the whole stability of the banking system might use some prudential tools in order 
to curtail excessive lending during boom periods and, by the same token although 
in the opposite direction, too conservative credit policies during recessions. 
The empirical literature on the relationship between excessive loan growth and credit 
risk is scant. The first contribution of this paper is to provide more precise and robust 
evidence of a positive, although quite lagged, relationship between rapid credit growth and 
future non-performing loans of banks. Moreover, we also find a direct relation between the 
phase of the lending cycle and the quality and the standards of the loans granted. During 
lending booms, riskier borrowers obtain funds and collateral requirements are significantly 
decreased. Lower credit standards and a substantial lag between decisions made on loan 
portfolios and the final appearance of loan losses point towards credit risk significantly 
increasing during good times. Therefore, credit risk increases in boom periods although it 
only pops up as loan losses during bad times. 
The second contribution of the paper is to develop a loan loss provision (i.e. a 
prudential tool) that takes into account the former developments. The idea is that banks 
should provision during good times for the increasing risk that is entering in their portfolios 
and that will only reveal as such with a lag. On the other hand, in bad times banks could use 
the reserves acumulated during boom periods in order to cover the loan losses that appear 
but that entered the portfolio in the past. Thus, we develop a countercyclical provision that is 
a direct answer to the robust empirical finding of credit risk increasing in good times. 
Accounting frameworks usually do not allow for countercyclical provisioning, that is, 
for the coverage today of latent credit risk in banks’ portfolios. Therefore, given the interest of 
supervisors in a prudent coverage of risks, it might be possible to transform the former 
countercyclical provision into a capital requirement based on an stress test included in Pillar 2 
of Basel II, the new regulatory capital framework for banks. In doing that, those that have 
shown concerns about increased procyclicality of Basel II might find some help. 
All in all, the paper combines theoretical arguments with robust empirical findings to 
provide the rationale for a countercyclical loan loss provision. The paper is a contribution 
to the intense debate among supervisors and academics on the proper tools to enhance 
financial stability. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
NPLit is the non-performing loan ratio, that is, the quotient between non-performing loans and 
total loans. GDPGt is the real rate of growth of gross domestic product. RIRt is the real 
interest rate, calculated as the interbank interst rate less the inflation of the period. LOANGit is 
the rate of the growth of loans for bank i. HERFRit is the Herfindahl index of bank i in terms of 
the amount lent to each region. HERFIit is the Herfindahl index of bank i in terms of the 
amount lent to each industry. COLINDit is the percentage of fully collateralized loans to 
households over total loans for bank i. COLFIRit is the percentage of fully collateralized loans 
to firms over total loans for bank i. SIZEit is the market share of  bank i. All variables in 
percentage points. i is for bank and t for year. 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
NPLit 3.94 5.70 0.00 99.90
GDPGt 2.90 1.51 -1.03 4.83
RIRt 4.14 2.90 -0.67 8.12
LOANGi,t-2 17.36 14.37 -17.29 71.97
LOANGi,t-3 17.37 13.93 -13.80 67.82
LOANGi,t-4 17.54 14.09 -11.10 64.68
HERFRit 52.68 24.86 11.26 98.87
HERFIit 18.47 9.82 7.45 70.26
COLINDit 19.25 16.28 0.00 69.91
COLFIRit 20.47 12.89 0.00 70.35
SIZEit 0.59 1.05 0.00 8.79
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Table  2. GMM estimation results of equation: 
[ ] [ ]
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In this regression the dependant variable, the non-performing loan ratio (NPLit), has been 
replaced by its logistic transformation to obtain a non bounded dependant variable: 
Log[NPLit /(100-NPLit)]. The lagged dependent variable is introduced as an explanatory 
variable to account for persistence effects over time. GDPGt is the real rate of growth of gross 
domestic product. RIRt is the real interest rate, calculated as the interbank interst rate less the 
inflation of the period. LOANGit is the rate of the growth of loans for bank i. HERFRit is the 
Herfindahl index of bank i in terms of the amount lent to each region. HERFIit is the Herfindahl 
index of bank i in terms of the amount lent to each industry.  COLINDit is the percentage of 
fully collateralized loans to households over total loans for bank i. COLFIRit is the percentage 
of fully collateralized loans to firms over total loans for bank i. SIZEit is the market share of  
bank i. ηi control for unobserved bank fixed effects. HERFRit, HERFIit, COLFIRit, COLINDit are 
treated as endogenous using lags t-2 and t-3. NPLit-1 is predetermined and 3 lags have been 
used as instruments (i.e. NPLit-2, NPLit-3 and NPLit-4). Robust SE reported. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
  NPLi,t-1 0.5524 0.0887 *** 0.5520 0.0889 *** 0.5499 0.0841 *** 0.5447 0.0833 ***
Macroeconomic characteristics
  GDPGt -0.0631 0.0135 *** -0.0654 0.0137 *** -0.0709 0.0131 *** -0.0716 0.0134 ***
  GDPGt-1 -0.0771 0.0217 *** -0.0770 0.0220 *** -0.0750 0.0212 *** -0.0777 0.0209 ***
  RIRt 0.0710 0.0194 *** 0.0703 0.0193 *** 0.0704 0.0195 *** 0.0711 0.0192 ***
  RIRt-1 0.0295 0.0103 *** 0.0292 0.0103 *** 0.0262 0.0098 *** 0.0263 0.0101 ***
Bank characteristics
  LOANGi,t-2 -0.0008 0.0013  -0.0008 0.0013  
  LOANGi,t-3 0.0018 0.0012  0.0018 0.0012  
  LOANGi,t-4  (α) 0.0034 0.0012 *** 0.0029 0.0012 **
  |LOANGi,t-2 - AVERAGE LOANGi| 0.0004 0.0017  
  |LOANGi,t-3 - AVERAGE LOANGi| -0.0005 0.0016  
  |LOANGi,t-4 - AVERAGE LOANGi| (β) 0.0025 0.0019  
  LOANGi,t-2 - AVERAGE LOANGt 0.0007 0.0012  0.0011 0.0013  
  LOANGi,t-3 - AVERAGE LOANGt 0.0015 0.0013  0.0014 0.0014  
  LOANGi,t-4 - AVERAGE LOANGt (α) 0.0025 0.0013 ** 0.0020 0.0013  
  |LOANGi,t-2 - AVERAGE LOANGt| -0.0026 0.0018  
  |LOANGi,t-3 - AVERAGE LOANGt| 0.0017 0.0017  
  |LOANGi,t-4 - AVERAGE LOANGt| (β) 0.0029 0.0018  
  HERFRit 0.0212 0.0096 ** 0.0209 0.0097 ** 0.0207 0.0098 ** 0.0218 0.0099 **
  HERFIit -0.0032 0.0094  -0.0025 0.0095  -0.0038 0.0098  -0.0026 0.0097  
  COLFIRit 0.0034 0.0063  0.0034 0.0063  0.0034 0.0065  0.0046 0.0065  
  COLINDit -0.0125 0.0072 * -0.0125 0.0072 * -0.0141 0.0073 * -0.0141 0.0074 *
  SIZEit 0.0199 0.0482  0.0153 0.0486  0.0213 0.0475  0.0261 0.0484  
Time dummies no no no no
No. Observations 868 868 868 868
Time period 1984-2002 1984-2002 1984-2002 1984-2002
Sargan test [χ(2)138] / p-value 124.76 0.78 125.56 0.77 123.85 0.80 122.86 0.82
Firts order autocorrelation (m1) -5.43 -5.37 -5.36 -5.28
Second order autocorrelation (m2) -1.27 -1.4 -1.34 -1.24
Test asymmetric impact (p-value)
α+β=0 -- 0.01 -- 0.01
α−β=0 -- 0.84 -- 0.73
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
DEFAULT is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the loan is doubtful, and 0 otherwise. LOANGit is 
the growth rate of all financial credits granted to firms by bank i. 
 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
DEFAULTijt+2 (0/1) 0.008 0.09 0.00 1.00
DEFAULTijt+3 (0/1) 0.004 0.07 0.00 1.00
DEFAULTijt+4 (0/1) 0.002 0.05 0.00 1.00
LOANGi,t 20.08 19.64 -40.10 115.15
Maturity 1y-3y (0/1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Maturity 3y-5y (0/1) 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Maturity >5y (0/1) 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
 Table 4. Estimation results of the equation: 
( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +++−+−+==+ iηφijtvariablesControliLOANGAverageitLOANGβiLOANGAverageitLOANGαθFkijtDEFAULT t)1Pr( , 
using a random effect logit model. DEFAULT is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the loan is doubtful, and 0 otherwise. LOANGit is the growth rate of all financial credits granted to firms 
by bank i. We also control for size and type (i.e. commercial or savings) of the bank and for characteristics of the loan (i.e. size, maturity and collateral). Region, industry, and time 
dummies have been included. 
 
PANEL A 
 
PANEL B 
 
Variables Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Dependant variable DEFAULTijt+2 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+2 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+3 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+3 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+4 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+4 (0/1)
Bank characteristics
  LOANGit - AVERAGE LOANGi (α) 0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001 * 0.002 0.001 *** 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.001 ** 0.002 0.002
  |LOANGit - AVERAGE LOANGi| (β) -- -- 0.005 0.001 *** -- -- 0.001 0.001  -- -- 0.000 0.002
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. Observations 1,823,656 1,823,656 1,643,708 1,643,708 1,433,074 1,433,074
Time period 1985-2004 1985-2004 1985-2004 1985-2004 1985-2004 1985-2004
Wald test [χ(2)] / p-value 8,959 0.00 9,121 0.00 4,800 0.00 4,874 0.00 2,992 0.00 3,054
Test asymmetric impact (p-value)
α+β=0 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 0.04
α−β=0 -- 0.00 -- 0.93 -- 0.55
Variables Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Dependant variable DEFAULTijt+2 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+3 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+4 (0/1)
Bank characteristics
  LOANGit 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.001 *** 0.002 0.001 ***
Province dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
No. Observations 1,823,656 1,643,708 1,433,074
Time period 1985-2004 1985-2004 1985-2004
Wald test [χ(2)] / p-value 8,966 0.00 4,802 0.00 2,987 0.00
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 Table 5. Estimation results of the equation: 
)()1Pr( 111 ijklttttijklt VariablesControlGaverageGDPGDPGβGDPGαθFCollateral +−++== −−−  
using a probit model. COLLATERAL is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the loan granted to a firm is collateralised, and 0 otherwise. GDPG is the real growth rate of gross domestic 
product. We also control for size, type (i.e. commercial, savings) and lending specialization of the bank, for borrower characteristics (i.e. if they were in default the year before 
or the year after the loan was granted, its indebtedness level and age as borrower), for characteristics of the borrower-lender relationship (duration and scope) as well as for the 
level of competition in the loan market, the size of the loan, the industry and the region of the borrower. 
 
 
 
 
All terms Long term Short term Long term Short term
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Dependent Variable
COLLATERALt (1/0)
Macroeconomic characteristics
  GDPG t-1 (α) -0.045 0.001 *** -0.047 0.001 *** -0.067 0.001 *** -0.021 0.002 *** -0.054 0.002 *** -0.019 0.004 ***
  |GDPG t-1 - Average GDPG t-1| (β) -- -- -0.011 0.002 *** -0.004 0.002 ** -0.026 0.004 *** 0.002 0.004 -0.027 0.007 ***
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. Observations 1,972,336 1,972,336 823,340 723,924 254,755 170,317
Time period 1985-2002 1985-2002 1985-2002 1985-2002 1985-2002 1985-2002
χ2  covariates / p-value 279,056 0.00 279,007 0.00 147,630 0.00 39,368 0.00 41,708 0.00 13,668 0.00
Test asymmetric impact (p-value)
α+β=0 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
α−β=0 -- 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.26
All Borrowers Old Borrowers New Borrowers
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Table 6.  Simulation of the new general loan loss provision (specific+latent+cyclical) 
 
ITEMS y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 means
1. Total loans
a)     Outstanding stock 1,000 1,160 1,334 1,494 1,643 1,759 1,811 1,884 2,034 2,238 2,506 2,857
b)     Rate of growth (%) 16.0 15.0 12.0 10.0 7.0 3.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 10.1 (γ)
c)     Credit cycle position 5.9 4.9 1.9 -0.1 -3.1 -7.1 -6.1 -2.1 -0.1 1.9 3.9
2. Profits before provisions
d)     Level 21.5 23.2 25.1 26.1 26.6 26.6 26.1 26.6 27.7 29.3 31.7 34.8
e)     Rate of growth 8.0 8.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0
3. Net loan loss provision
f)     Specific 1.7 2.7 4.5 6.6 13.2 19.9 15.1 11.2 9.0 7.5 5.7
g)     General (latent) 0.015 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.7 0.8 1.1 2.3 3.1 4.0 5.3
h)     Total 4.1 5.3 6.9 8.8 14.9 20.7 16.2 13.4 12.0 11.5 11.0
4. Cyclical provision
i) α 0.050
j)     Cyclical provision 3.0 2.8 1.3 -0.1 -2.5 -6.2 -5.5 -2.0 -0.1 2.1 4.9
k)     Cyclical fund 15.0 18.0 20.8 22.1 22.0 19.5 13.2 7.7 5.7 5.7 7.8 12.7
5. Total loan loss provisions 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.7 12.4 14.5 10.6 11.5 11.9 13.7 15.9
6. Profits after provisions
l)     Without Cyclical provision 19.1 19.8 19.2 17.8 11.7 5.4 10.4 14.2 17.3 20.1 23.8 16.3
m)     With Cyclical provision 16.1 17.0 17.9 17.9 14.2 11.6 16.0 16.2 17.4 18.0 18.9 16.5
7. % OVER TOTAL LOANS
n) Net loan loss provision 0.36 0.40 0.46 0.54 0.85 1.14 0.86 0.66 0.54 0.46 0.38 0.60
o)     Specific 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.75 1.10 0.80 0.55 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.47
p)     General 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.14
q) Cyclical provision 0.25 0.21 0.09 0.00 -0.14 -0.34 -0.29 -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.17 -0.01
r) Cyclical fund 1.50 1.55 1.56 1.48 1.34 1.11 0.73 0.41 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.44
s) Total loan loss provisions 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.53 0.70 0.80 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.60
8. Profits after provisions
t)     Without cyclical provision 1.64 1.48 1.28 1.08 0.66 0.30 0.55 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.92
u)     With cyclical provision 1.39 1.27 1.20 1.09 0.81 0.64 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.72 0.66 0.93  
Note: All italic figures are taken as given. 
a) Stock of all loans given the growth rate in b) and an initial value of 1,000 (benchmark). 
c) Credit cycle position is computed as b) minus the average growth rate of the loans in the 
period. 
d) Level of the profits before provision given their growth rate in e) and an initial value of 21.5. 
f) Specific provision given its weight over total loans o). 
g) 0.015*change in outstanding loans. 
h) Sum of f) and g). 
j) Cyclical provision given by α(∆Outstanding loanst-γ Outstanding loanst-1). 
k) The cyclical fund is the sum of the previous fund plus the cyclical provision of the year. 
l) Profits after provisions without the cyclical provision computed as d)-h). 
m) Profits after provisions with cyclical provision computed as d)-Total loan loss provision (5). 
p) g)/a). 
n) o)+p). 
q) j)/ a). 
r) k)/ a). 
s) 5)/ a). 
t) l)/ a). 
u) m)/a). 
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Chart 1. Simulation exercise. 
Loan loss provisions as a percentage of total loans  
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